Why does the author say a single long term would reduce the incentive to 'flatter voters'?
Defenders of an appointed second chamber argue that elections would turn it into a rival to the lower house, producing gridlock. They have a point, but the present arrangement buys harmony at an unacceptable price: a legislature in which hundreds of members hold their seats through patronage or inheritance. We do not usually think that a body must be unaccountable to be useful. The risk of gridlock is a matter of design. A chamber elected for a single long term, with no prospect of re-election, would have less incentive to flatter voters or to challenge the government for the sake of it. Such a chamber would retain the benefit of independence while gaining the legitimacy that appointment can never supply.
Answer and explanation
Correct answer: D. Members who cannot seek re-election have no need to win votes in later contests
- Step 1: The passage ties the incentive to flatter voters to a prospect of re-election.
- Step 2: Remove re-election, and the incentive weakens.
Answer
Members who cannot seek re-election have no need to win votes in later contests.
Why not the others: The passage does not mention secrecy, lots, ignorance of opinion or government control.
Practise more Parliament.
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